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CRIMINAL LAW-THE FELONY-UfURDER DOCTRINE
REPUDIATED
In Stephen's History of Cmmnal Law of England, it is
stated that malice aforethought, one of the necessary elements of
the crime of murder, is found in the following circumstances
(A) Where there is an intention to cause the death
of, or grievous bodily harm to, any person.
(B) Where there is knowledge that an act or onnmsion
which causes death, will probably cause death of, or
grievous bodily harm to, some person.
(C) Where there is an intention to commit "any
felony whatever," if during the commission of, or attempt
to commit, the felony, death results.
(D) Where there is an intention to oppose by force an
officer in arresting or keeping in custody one whom he has
a right to arrest or keep m custody 1
It is the purpose of this paper to present briefly the history
and development of (C) of Stephen's analysis of malice
aforethought, and then to discuss the desirability of tins
doctrine today
The doctrine has been traced back to Coke, who stated that
killing in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any
crime, whether a felony or a lesser offense, was murder. 2 The
rule was somewhat modified by Foster, who said that a homicide
committed "in the prosecution of a felonious intention" was
murder.3
Stephen was highly critical of the rule m his work on
criminal law, and attempted to rationalize its introduction into
the common law by pointing out that at the time the rule
originated, all felomes were capital offenses, and therefore the
rule did not work an injustice.4 Stephen made excellent use of
his opportunity to give the death blow to the felony-murder
doctrine in Regina v Serne,5 in which he said that although
13 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAM (1883)
22.
3 COKE'S INSTITUTES (6th ed. 1680) 56.
-FOSTER,
CROWN LAW (2d ed. 1791) 258.
4
STEPHEN, op. cit. supra, note 1, 75.
16 Cox C. C. 311 (1877).
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a ldlling may be committed in the perpetration of a felony,
the act causing the death must have been one "known to be
dangerous to life."
Thus Stephen eliminated (C) in his
analysis of malice, and made conviction of murder for holmcide
in the commission of a felony dependent upon proof that the
requirements of (B) of his analysis are met.
Although the felony-murder doctrine -was eliminated in
England almost sixty years ago, 7 the rule remains in force in
the United States. In this country, it appears that there are
two distinct interpretations of the rule. By one of these interpretations, homicide committed in the course of any felony
is murder. s By the other interpretation, only homicide committed in the course of certain so-called dangerous felomes is
murder without proof of actual malice. 9 The dangerous felomes
generally are said to be arson, rape, robbery, and burglary 10
The interpretation of the rule which a court adopts frequently
is controlled by the statute of the particular state. Some statutes, in defining murder, say that homicide in the commission
of any felony shall be murder,i -while other statutes say that
homicide in the commission of certain enumerated felonies shall
be murder. 12 Apparently only one state in this country refuses to apply the felony-murder doctrine at all. Ohio, because
its statute defining murder requires a homicide to be committed intentionally, does not recognize implied malice, which is
the basis of the felony-murder doctrine.13
It is the opinion of the writer that Stephen did a great
service to the English law when he repudiated the felony'Ibid.
"Ibid.
8
People v De La Rol, 36 Cal. App. 287, 97 P 2d 836 (1939),
Simpson v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 831, 170 S.W 2d 869 (1943)
'Washington v. State, 181 Ark. 1011, 28 S.W 2d 1055 (1930),
State v Schnelt, 341 Mo. 241, 108 S.W 2d 377 (1937), State v. Mays,
285 N. C. 480, 35 S. E. 2d 494 (1945).
1" State v. Schnelt, 341 Mo. 241, 108 S.W
2d 377 (1937).
ULAws OF N. Y. (Thompson, 1939) Penal Laws, sec. 1044(2),
OKLA. STAT. (1941) Tit. 21, sec. 701(3)
'IND.
STAT. (Burns, 1933) sec. 10-3401, REv. STAT. OF Mo.
(1939) sec. 4376.
"Turk v. State, 48 Ohio App. 469, 194 N. E. 425, affd. 129 Ohio
St. 245, 194 N. E. 453 (1934) It would appear that Ohio's interpretation of its murder statute would eliminate the negligent murder as well as the felony murder, since both are dependent upon
implied malice.
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murder doctrine, and that the American courts would do well to
follow his lead. There are at least three reasons for elimmating the felony-murder doctrine. (1) The rule is not logical-in
many instances it disregards the causal relation between the
felony and the homicide. (2) In some cases the rule works an
injustice on the accused. (3) Rule (B) of Stephen's analysis,
the negligent-murder doctrine, is adequate to obtain convictions
of murder where homicide occurs in the commission of a
felony
As to the question of causal relation, it must be pointed
out that the rule only requires that the homicide be committed
in the course of the felony for it to amount to murder. It is
quite conceivable that in the course of committing a felony,
one "might perform some perfectly innocent act winch would
cause the death of another, and thus be guilty of murder
although he had neither intended to kill nor shown a wanton
disregard for life. For example, a man, in the course of stealing
a car, might run into and kill a drunk who deliberately walked in
front of the automobile, and in such a case the felon would be
guilty of murder although he had acted with the utmost caution.
This disregard for causal relation, in certain instances,
has resulted in serious injustices. In a case winch occurred in
California, 14 one of the defendants, in the course of robbing ins
victim, struck him on the chin. The blow was not so severe that
it could have been expected to cause death or serious bodily
harm, but in this case it resulted in the death of the recipient
and in the conviction of murder for the perpetrator.
Further evidence of the injustice of the rule is found in
its application to cases in which there are conspiracies to
commit felonies. It is the well established rule that if two or
more persons cohspire to commit a felony, and in the course
of the felony someone is killed, all conspirators are guilty
of murder.i 5 Thus one might conspire to manufacture
illegal whiskeyi" or to commit unarmed robbery, 7 and if a
fellow conspirator, acting in the course of the felony, killed
v Kaye, 43 Cal. 802, 111 P 2d 679 (1941).
"People v. Kaye, 43 Cal. 802, Ill P 2d 679 (1941),
Robmett, 279 S.W 696 (Mo. 1926).
"GState
v Robinett, 279 S.W 696 (Mo. 1926).
"7 People v Kaye, 43 Cal. 802, Ill P 2d 679 (1941).
14People

State v.
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someone, both would be guilty of murder. This seems completely unfair to the conspirator who neither intended to have
the felony result in the death of anyone, nor expected it to be
dangerous in any way
As a final reason for doing away with the felony-murder
doctrine, it is submitted that the negligent-murder doctrine is
adequate to obtain convictions of murder where such convictions
axe justified. The history of the development of the criminal
side of the common law shows an unceasing effort to make the
pumshment fit the crime. Capital punishment is no longer
provided for pickpockets, apparently on the theory that such
severe treatment for a crime of such a trivial nature did not
serve to deter the commission of the crime. But the felonymurder doctrine disregards the nuances of punishment which
have developed through the centuries, and it appears as an unsavory anachronism in the present day law. It does not look
to the state of mind or relative guilt of the felon, but it punishes
the man who steals a few dollars as a cold-blooded murderer if
the thief is so unfortunate as to cause someone's death, while he
is committing a lesser felony
In such cases, the felon is
condemned to death or long imprisonment, not for murder,
but for having committed a felony Of course, if the thief
intends to kill in order to carry out his plan to steal, or if he
acts without regard for the lives of others, he deserves to be
pumshed as a murderer. But this can be achieved without
making use of the felony-murder doctrine, because then the
thief will be guilty of intentional murder or negligent murder.
FRANK SELBY HURST

